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Article 2

RES IPSA IN THE AIR
CHARLES F. O'CONNOR

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor' is a shorthand method
of saying that an accident itself is of such a character that
it: (1) affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation, to permit an inference of culpability on the part
of the defendant, (2) makes out the plaintiff's prima facie
case, and (3) presents a question of fact for the defendant
to meet with an explanation. 2 However, in airplane accident
cases the shorthand has not been too legible. Generally speaking, if there is anything unique in airplane accidents the
variations from normal would seem to induce rather than
retard the application of the doctrine. Nevertheless, the cases
disclose a constant caution and continuing confusion in the
application of res ipsa to aviation.
In any accident case (regardless of the type of instrumentality which caused the harm) the courts will not apply
res ipsa unless the following circumstances attended the
injury:
(1) The general experience of mankind shows that the
accident was such as does not usually occur in the
ordinary course of events without negligence on the
part of those in control.
(2) The person against whom the doctrine is sought to be
invoked must have been in exclusive control of the
instrumentality.
(3) The person invoking the doctrine must not be in a
position to know the cause of the accident.
(4) The person against whom the doctrine is invoked must
possess knowledge concerning the cause of the accident,
or he must be in a better position to obtain that knowledge, so that the duty of explaining the accident should,
in fairness, rest upon him because of -his greater knowledge or greater means of knowledge.2
After hearing all the evidence the court should bring
the doctrine into consideration by instructing the jury as
1.
2.
3.

Literal translation: "The thing speaks for itself."
Berent v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 279 Ill., App. 430 (1935).
Reiber, "Some Aspects of Air Carriers' Liability" (1946) Law &
Contemp. Prob. 524,530.
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to whether, from the accident involved, there arises an inference that the proximate cause was some negligent conduct
4
on the part of the defendant.
The authorities are divided on the effect of the doctrine
on the plaintiff's burden of proof. Many states adopt the
view that the inference is evidence only, and even if the
defendant offers no evidence tending to outweigh this inference, the case must still go to the jury. If the inference
preponderates in favor of the plaintiff, when all of the evidence in the case is considered, then such inference warrants
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff; otherwise not.' Several
states adopt the view that res ipsa shifts the burden of producing evidence to the defendant, and, if the defendant offers
no evidence, the verdict should be directed against him. But
if he offers any evidence (however slight) the case must
go to the jury. In other states the doctrine operates to shift
the burden of proof to the defendant, and, unless he produces
substantial evidence to outweigh the presumption, there will
be a directed verdict. To be entitled to a jury verdict, he
must produce a preponderance of the evidenceA
From the discussion in 1809 when Lord Mansfield held
the burden was upon the owner of a stage coach to prove
that he had hired a good driver, had provided steady horses
and a sound coach, the doctrine has been applied to injuries
caused by practically every mode of common carriage-stagecoaches, steam and electric railroads, steamships, scenic rail-7
roads, automobiles, motorcoaches, taxicabs, and elevators.
At present, courts are presented with the problem of whether
res ipsa should be applied to aviation.
The doctrine has been rejected in aviation cases where
one or more of the necessary circumstances for its application
were not present. Thus, when the instrumentality (the airplane) was not in the exclusive control of the defendant,
res ipsa was not applied.8 It was held not applicable in a
4. Thompson, "Inference of Negligence in Aviation Accident Cases"
(1944) 259 Ins. L.J. 461.
5. Osterhout, "The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor as Applied to
Aviation" (1931) 2 Air L. Rev. 13.
6. Harper and Heckel, "Effect of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor"
(1927) 22 Ill. L. Rev. 724, 726.
7. Note (1933) 4 J. Air L. 429,430.
8. Budgett v. Soo Sky Ways, 64 S.D. 243, 266 N.W. 253 (1936);
Towle v. Phillips, 180 Tenn. 121, 172 S.W. (2d) 806 (1943);
Michigan Aero Club v. Shelley, 1938 U.S. Av. R. 134; Madych v.
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case where the plaintiff was in a position to know (and did
know) the actual cause of the accident, 9 the court saying,
"This ruling is not to be taken as expressing the court's view
as applied to a case in which proof of the precise cause of
the accident is wanting." 10 In another aviation case11 the
court refused res ipsa because the defendant did not possess
superior knowledge or means of knowledge of the cause of
the accident.
The results in these, and similar cases, are not authority
for the proposition that res ipsa is not applicable to aviation
cases. They stand merely for the well established rule that
where an essential circumstance is missing, the doctrine will
not be applied, regardless of the instrumentality.
Where the plaintiff alleges specific acts of negligence,
a few jurisdictions prevent him from relying on res ipsa,
but the view of most courts is that allegations of specific
2
acts of negligence do not bar the application of the doctrine.'Better reasoning supports this view; i.e., to have a good
complaint, the plaintiff must plead negligence. He cannot
plead less, and, by alleging specific acts of negligence, he
does not do more, so there is no reason to deny the application. 13 Furthermore, the doctrine is founded on the absence
of specific proof of facts or omissions constituting negligence,
not on the absence of specific allegations thereof.In air law, as in other fields, only the minority holds
that reliance on specific allegations of negligence forfeits

9.

Shelley, 1938 U.S. Av. R. 79; Harper, "Res Ipsa Loquitor in Air
Law" (1930) 1 Air L. Rev. 478, 479 "Res ipsa raises a double presumption. It raises a presumption of negligence and a presumption that defendant's negligence was the legal cause of the injury. The latter is sometimes denied, but what is actually intended
is that there is no presumption that defendant's acts were the
cause in fact of the injury. Now if the instrument or agency
vhich precipitated the injury is not under the exclusive control
of the defendant, the basis for the presumption of legal cause
fails. The injury might just as readily be caused by the negligence of a third party as by the defendant's presumed negligence."
Law v. Transcontinental, 1931 U.S. Av. R. 205.

10. Id. at 207.
11.
12.

Parker v. Granger, 4 Cal. (2d) 668, 39 P. (2d) 883 (1934), aff'd.

52 P.(2d) 226 (1936).

Harper, "Res ipsa Loquitor in Air Law" (1930) 1 Air L. Rev. 478;
Niles, "Pleading Res Ipsa Loquitor" (1929) 7 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev.
415; Note (1932) 3 J.Air L. 662,664.
13. Harper and Heckel, "Effect of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur"
(1927) 22 Ill. L. Rev. 724, 727.
14. Banger et al. v. Chelpon, 60 S.D. 66, 243 N.W. 97 (1932).
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the right to invoke res ipsa;15 the majority hold that the
specific allegations of negligence are mere surplusage and
8 Where the
the plaintiff has a right to rely on res ipsa.1
plaintiff is able to prove specific allegations of negligence,
the courts usually refuse to determine whether r'es ipsa is
applicable, and permit recovery based on the proved acts
of negligenceY.1
Indeed, a court may not ignore the plaintiff's specific
allegation of negligence and submit the case to the jury
solely on res ipsa. To do so constitutes reversible error.' 8
Thus, when the circumstances are such as would permit the
application of the doctrine, a plaintiff, be invoking it, in
addition to alleging specific acts of negligence, only adds to
the power of his attack. No disadvantage results, as his
reliance on the latter is in no way weakened by his invocation of the former. Nevertheless, many plaintiffs have elected to rely solely on specific allegations of negligence and
have ignored res ipsa.
Frequently these plaintiffs successfully prove their specific allegations and receive a verdict in their favor.' 9 They,
of course, are not harmed by their- failure to invoke the
doctrine. Just as frequently, however, plaintiffs fail to prove
specific allegations of negligence and verdicts are returned
in favor of the defendants.2 0 They failed to avail themselves
of an attack which could not have prejudiced their cases,
but which might have earned decisions in their favor.
15.
16.

17.
18.
19.

20.

Miller v. English, 141 Mo. 602, 43 S.W. (2d) 642 (1932); Cope v.
Air Association, 1937 U.S. Av. R. 99.
Seaman v. Curtiss Flying Service, 231 App. Div. 867, 245 N.Y.
Supp. 251 (1930), 1931 U.S. Av. R. 227; Genero v. Ewing, 176
Wash. 78, 28 P.(2d) 116 (1934); Stoll v. Curtiss Flying Service,
236 App. Div. 664, 257 N.Y. Supp. 1010 (1932), 1932 U.S. Av. R. 153.
Conklin Adm'x. v. Canadian Col. Airways, 266 N.Y. 244, 194
N.E. 692 (1934); McCusker v. Curtiss Wright, 269 Ill. App. 502
(1933), 1933 U.S. Av. R. 105.
Goodheart Adm'r. v. Am. Airlines, 252 App. Div. 660, 1 N.Y.S.
(2) 288 (1938), 1938 U.S. Av. R. 148.
Curtiss-Wright v. Glose, 290 U.S. 696 (1933); T.A.T. Flying
Service v. Adamson, 47 Ga. App. 108, 159 S.E. 851 (1933); Conklin
v. Curtiss Flying Service, 1930 U.S. Av. R. 188; Hagymasi v.
Colonial Western, 1931 U.S. Av. R. 73; Beale v. Talbert, 1932
U.S. Av. R. 94.
Allison v. Standard Air Lines, 65 F.(2d) 668 (1933), 1933
U.S. Av. R. 92; Johnson v. West Air Ex. Co., 45 Cal. App. (2d)
614, 114 P. (2d) 688 (1941); Bird v. Louer, 272 Ill. 522 (1934),
1934 U.S. Av. R. 188; Murphy v. Neely, 319 Pa. 566, 179 Atl. 439
(1935); Kimmel and Byrd v. Penn. Airlines, 1937 U.S Av. R. 104.

19471

RES IPSA IN THE AIR

In two aviation cases, 21 the plaintiffs alleged on appeal

that even though they had not relied on the doctrine, the
trial court erred in not invoking it. In both cases, the appelate courts held that this responsibility was on the plaintiff,
and in the absence of a request from him for an instruction
to the jury concerning the doctrine, the trial courts did not
err by failing to so instruct. However, in Seaman v. Curtiss
Flying Service,2 2 the court held that this responsibility rested
with the trial court and that its failure to invoke the doctrino
constituted reversible error.
One of the principal arguments against the application
of res ipsa in aviation cases is that the industry is so young
that reliable statistics are not yet available; that it is impossible to tell just what are the causes of air accidents.
Therefore, it is argued that without specific evidence on the
subject, it cannot be said that an accident would have occurred
23
if an air transport company had used due care.
Courts which accept this argument will not apply res
ipsa if there exists any other reasonable or probable cause
from which it might be inferred that there was no negligence
at all. Thus, in Cohn, Adm'x. v. U.S. Airlines,24 the court
rejected the doctrine, saying that a variety of causes might
have brought about the disaster; e.g., weather, air pockets,
engine failure, etc; an Arkansas court,25 refused to apply
res ipsa on the ground that the accident might have been
caused by an act of God. Similarly, in Morrison v. Le Tourneau Co.,20 the court suggested that there existed reasonable

and probable causes other than negligence on the part of
the defendant, and refused the doctrine, saying that accidents
of this nature can happen to the most skilled pilots in planes
of the finest type and condition without the existence of any
negligence. That the disaster might have been the result
of latent engine defects or vibrations, induced the court in
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Allison v. Standard Air Lines, 65 F. (2d) 668 (1933), 1933 U.S.
Av. R. 92; Johnson v. West Air Ex. Co., 45 Cal. App. (2d) 614,
114 P. (2d) 688 (1941).
231 App. Div. 867, 245 N.Y. Supp. 251 (1930), 1931 U.S. Av. R. 227.
Allen, "Transportation by Air and The Doctrine of Res Ipsa
Loquitur" (1930) 16 A.B.A.J.455, 458.
17 F. Supp. 865 (1937), 1937 U.S.Av.R. 119.
Herndon v. Gregory, 190 Ark. 702, 81 S.W. (2d) 849 (1935);

82 S.W. (2d) 244 (1985).
26. 138 Fed. (2d)"339 (1943), 1943 U.S. Av. R. 22.
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Wilson v. Colonial Air Transport, Inc., 27 to hold that since
these causes did not involve negligence, res ipsa was not
applicable.
Also it is argued that res ipsa is inapplicable because
the air transportation industry has not yet reached the stage
of perfection where planes will not crash, in the usual course
of events, unless the operating company or its agents are
negligent. 28 So in Rochester Corp. v. Dunlop,29 the court
refused to apply res ipsa, saying, "In the present stage of
aircraft development, it cannot be said, in the ordinary experience of mankind, that the mere fall of a plane for an
unknown reason necessarily proves that the accident could
not-have happened without negligence." Similarly in Deojay
v. Lyford,80 the court, in rejecting the doctrine, said, "In
spite . . . of the vast advances which have been made in

air transportation, it is still recognized that in all such operations there is a wide element of chance which the ingenuity
of man has not yet overcome; we accordingly cannot apply
the doctrine to the same extent that we do to accidents on
the highways.***' The truth of the matter is that the facts

of each case must be carefully considered, and in the days
to come, tested in the light of the advances in this art which
we are certain to see." Likewise, limited knowledge concerning the care and operation of airplanes does not warrant the
application of res ipsa.3 1 "Man has made rapid strides to
become master of the air, but because of the large number
of unexplained catastrophies, it is evident that he has not2
32
In Thomas v. American Airways,'
yet become master. 2
the court instructed the jury that they were to determine,
from the evidence presented, whether the aviation industry
was such that the accident would not have occurred without
negligence on the part of those in control of the airplane. In
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

278 Mass. 420, 180 N.E. 212 (1932), 83 A.L.R. 329; For a discussion of this case see Note (1932) 3 J. Air L. 662.
Allen, "Transportation By Air and The Doctrine of Res Ipsa
Loquitur" (1930) 16 A.B.A.J. 455, 458.
148 Misc. 849, 266 N.Y. S. 469 (1933), 1933 U.S. Av. R. 511;
For a discussion of this case see Bohlen, "Aviation Under The Common Law" (1934) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 216.
139 Me. 234, 29 A. (2d) 111 (1942).
Towle v. Phillips, 180 Tenn. 121, 172 S.W. (2d) 806 (1943).
Cohn, Adm'x. v. U.S. Airlanes, 17 F. Supp. 865 (1937), 1937
U.S. Av. R. 119.
1935 U.S. Av. R. 102.
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two other cases, 34 the doctrine of res ipsa was rejected because it is a common occurrence for airplanes to fall without
the intervention of any negligence. In one other aviation case, ' "
the doctrine was rejected; the court refusing to grant plaintiff's request that the jury be instructed as to the applicability of res ipsa.
The principal argument for the use of res ipsa in aviation cases are: (1) public policy and (2) the difficulties
attending the plaintiff's attempt to prove the defendant's
negligance. As one writer states, "The real reason for the
rule, particularly in the case of common carriers (as evidenced by the multiude of decision involving carriers by
rail) is predicated upon public policy. Obviously, the same
public interest which seeks to protect travellers by rail must
reach forward to protect travelers by air. A passenger on
an airplane can never know what act or omision of the pilot
or what act of negligence in the maintenance of the airway
system has resulted in his injury." 36
In air carrier cases the plaintiff's difficulties are considerably greater than those of plaintiffs in surface carrier
cases, because: (1) Many crashes kill all occupants, leaving
no witnesses. For example, in forty-four domestic air line
accidents involving the death of a passenger between 1933
and 1942 incluive, twenty-nine resulted in the deaths of all
occupants and only fifteen left some survivors.
(2) The operation and navigation of aircraft are so technical that the testimony of lay witnesses, even when available,
is generally indefinite and of little value.
(3) The physical evidence of what occurred in an aircraft
at the time of, or immediately prior to, most serious accidents,
is often destroyed by the crash, consumed by fire, or accasionally lost under water.
(4) The path of an aircraft in the sky is more difficult
to reconstruct than the course of a vehicle on the ground.
Indeed, less than twenty per cent of the cases investigated by the former Bureau of Air Commerce reveal com34.

Smith v. Whitley, 223 N.C. 534, 27 S.E. (2d) 442 (1943); Boulineax v. City of Knoxville, 20 Tenn. App. 404, 99 S.W. (2d) 557
(1937).
35. Foot v. Northeastern Airways, 1931 U.S. Av. R. 66.
36. Note (1933) 4 J. Air L. 429, 433.
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T
petent evidence of the conduct of the aircraft operatorY
Thus, Professor Bohlen argues that "Whatever the future
may hold, it is certain that today flying can be made safe
only by the most meticulous care in the construction and
inspection of planes. Those who choose to fly and to invite
others to share in their flight, should bear the responsibility

of these essential precautions.

'3

8

Another writer argues that the doctrine should apply
because aircraft regulations are such that accidents are not
likely to happen in the absence of negligence on the part of
those in control and that the circumstances attending an aircraft accident are such that the defendant is better able to
explain the cause: "The common carriers by air are -constantly advertising to the public the high quality of safety of
their transportation systems. The Department of Commerce
regulations require air transport companies to maintain
meteorological stations, to provide for adequate inspection of
the mechanical and structural parts of the plane, to maintain adequate airports with modern lighting facilities and
to engage only highly skilled pilots. Certainly the defendant,
under such conditions, is better able to explain whether or
not he has complied with these requirements. Under such
circumstances, it would seem only fair to hold them to all of
5
the liabilities of common carriers under our system of law." 1
Airplane accidents can be grouped into the following
four general classifications: (1) Damage by aircraft (or
objects falling therefrom) to persons or property on the
ground; (2) Collision between airplanes; (3) Injury to
the aircraft itself by the bailee or lessee in control; (4) Injury or death to persons or property transported.
There is no real opposition to the application of the
doctrine to the first classification. Indeed, many authorities
who contend that the doctrine should not be applied to the
remaining classifications find no objection to its application
to cases where aircraft cause injury to persons or property
37.

Reiber, "Some Aspects of Air Carriers' Liability" (1946) Law
and Contemp. Prob. 524, 529; Buhler, "Limitation of Air Carriers' Tort Liability and Related Insurance Coverage-A Proposed
Federal Air Passengers' Liability Act" (1940) 11 Air L. Rev. 262,

288.
38. Bohlen, "Aviation Under the Common Law" (1934) 48 Harv. L.
Rev. 216, 237.
39. Note (1933) 4 J. Air L. 429, 435.
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on the ground.40 In explanation of this Professor Bohlen
says, "Where some purpose is served peculiar to those in
charge rather than common to the great masses of mankind,
it is held that these ventures must be carried out at the risk
of those interested in them and not at the risk of those whose
property in, the neighbad luck it is to be in, or to possess
1
borhood of their prosecution."'
Thus, the doctrine was applied where an airplane, in
attempting to land, struck an automobile and severely injured the plaintiff, an occupant of the automobile. 4'2 The
court applied res ipsa where the defendant's plane crashed
into the plaintiff's hangar. 43 Where the defendant, in attempting a forced landing, struck and killed the plaintiff's
son, the court held, "The present case is of that class in
which the instrumentality that produced the injury was
under the control and management of the defendant and the
accident was such as does not happen if due care has been
used. The accident having occurred under such circumstances,
upon the defendant to establish his freedom
the burden was
4
from fault.""1
Although there is opposition to the application of the
doctrine in cases which fall into classifications two, three,
and four, courts nevertheless, have applied it in cases in
each of these groups.
In Smith v. O'Donnell,45 the plaintiff was a passenger
in the defendant's plane which collided in mid-air with
another plane. The court said; "If a proper degree of care
is used, a collision of two airplanes in mid-air does not ordinarily occur and in such action, where defendant was a common carrier, and plaintiff was a passenger, and the collision
of the two planes took place in mid-air, the doctrine of res6
ipsa is applicable." In Ranger v. American Airlines, Inc.,"
the plaintiff, a passenger in the defendant's plane which was
Harper, "Res Ipsa Loquitor In Air Law" (1930) 1 Air L. Rev.
478; In connection with this, see Restatement, "Torts" (1934)
§520, comment b.
41. Bohlen, "Aviation Under the Common Law" (1934) 48 Harv. L.
Rev. 216, 217.
42. Sollak v. New York, 1929 U.S. Av. R. 42; (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1927).
43. Genero v. Ewing, 176 Wash. 78, 28 P.(2d) 116 (1934).
44. Kadylak v. O'Brien, 1941 U.S. Av. R. 8.
45. 215 Cal. 714, 5 P. (2d) 690, 12 P. (2d) 933 (1932).
46. 1943 U.S. Av. R. 122.
40.

230
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involved in a mid-air collision with an Army plane, was permitted the use of res ipsa.
In Braman-Johnson Flying Service, Inc. v. Thompson,
Jr., 4 7 the defendant was a bailee of the plaintiff's airplane.
On a flight, with the defendant in sole control, the plane
crashed. Plaintiff's recovery was probably based on his
specific proof of defendant's negligence, but the court by
way of dicta said, "Although the burden of proof of negligence in such cases (as in the case at bar) unquestionably
rests upon the plaintiff, yet he is not always required to
point out the precise act or omission in which the negligence
consists. The negligence may be inferred from the circumstances of the case."
Cases involving injury or death to persons transported
comprise the bulk of the tort litigation in aviation cases.
The first case of this type in which res ipsa was applied
was litigated in 1931.48 In 1932 the doctrine was again
applied. 49 Both cases grew out of the same accident; the
defendant's plane fell out of the sky (for an unknown reason)
killing the pilot and the two passengers.
In 1938 a plane took off on a regularly scheduled flight;
two days later it was found with its nose imbedded in a
mountain with all its passengers and crew dead. In an action
brought by the administrator of one of the passengers, the
court held that the doctrine of res ipsa was applicable 0 In
a 1945 case, 51 the plaintiff sought to recover for injuries
sustained as a passenger in defendant's plane which crashed
shortly after takeoff. Although the court did not mention
res ipsa as such, it stated that a presumption of negligence
arises.
In England, the doctrine is applicable to aviation and
applies whether or not the plaintiff, in addition to his reliance
on res ipsa, alleges specific acts of negligence. In a leading
English case5 2 in which the plaintiff relied on res ipsa and
47.

48.

3 N.Y. S. (2d) 602 (1938). 1938 U.S. Av. R. 153.

Seaman v. Curtiss Flying Service, 231 App. Div. 867, 245 N.Y. S.

251 (1930), 1931 U.S. Av. R. 227.

49. Stoll v. Curtiss Flying Service, 236 App. Div. 664, 257 N.Y. S.
50.
51.

1010 (1932), 1932 U.S. Av. R. 163.
Goodheart Adm. v. Am. Airlines, 252 App. Div. 660, 1 N.Y.S. (2d)
288 (1938), 1938 U.S. Av. R. 148.
Kamienski v. Bluebird Air Service, 321 Ill. App. 340, 53 N.E.(2d)
131 (1944), aff'd. 389 Ill. 462, 59 N.E. (2d) 853 (1945).

52. Fosbroke Hobbs v. Airworks, 1938 U.S. Av. R. 194, 197.
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alleged specific acts of negligence, the court held, "The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies. It was argued that I ought
not to apply this doctrine to an airplane, a comparatively
new means of locomotion, and one necessarily exposed to
the many risks which must be encountered in flying through
the air, but I cannot see that this is any reason for excluding it. Large numbers of airplanes are daily engaged in
carrying mails and passengers all over the world, and, as
is well-known, they arrive and depart with the regularity of
express train. They have indeed become a commonplace
method of travel, supplementing, though not superseding,
rail and transport."
So far as is known, the French have never applied the4
doctrine of res ipsa as such. 53 In at least one aviation case,U
the court, without mentioning the doctrine by name, indicated
that it would not be applied. In that case a passenger plane,
flying between Casa Blanca and Toulouse, crashed, and all
aboard were killed. The court refused to presume negligence
saying, "In the absence of all evidence, many other causes of
the accident could, with equal probability, be assigned, certain of which exclude all responsibility on the part of the
defendant company."
Canada apparently follows the English rule. In 1937,
the court applied the doctrine in an aviation case5 5 even
though specific acts of negligence were also alleged by the
plaintiff. In a 1942 case,58 the plaintiff's sole reliance was
on res ipsa and the court, in returning a verdict for him,
said, "Travel by air must now be regarded as a common
means of transportation, extensively used, not only in North
America, but in many other parts of the world. With experienced and careful pilots and proper equipment, a passenger has the right to expect that he will be carried safely
to his destination."
There is general agreement among air law practitioners
that the doctrine of res ipsa has not solved the problems
which arise out of airplane accidents. This very troublesome
53. Note (1932) 3 J.Air L. 662, 665.
54. Veuve de Courson de La Villeneuve v. Society Aeronautique
Latecocere, 11 Aevue Juridique Internationale De La Locomotion
Aerienne 239 (1927).
55. McImerny v. McDougal, 1938 U.S. Av. R. 166.
56. Malone and Moss v. Trans. Canada, 1942 U.S. Av. R. 144, 146.

232
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rule of evidence is at best only a stop-gap invented by humane
judges to help plaintiff surmount the high barriers presented
by the general rule that the plaintiff in a negligence suit
has the burden of proving some negligence on the part of
the defendant. Although the rule works successfully in
settled industries its history in airplane litigation has not
been satisfactory. A well-planned statute could do better. 7
Progress in this direction has been made in the field
of international air transportation by the adoption of the
Warsaw Convention5 8 which was concluded in 1929, and the
Rome Convention- 9 which was concluded in 1933. These
Conventions contain a body of rules for determining liability
and were offered as the basis of treaties to be entered into
among the various nations engaged in air commerce. They
are, therefore, intended to apply only to the liability of
operators foreign to the country in which the injury occurs.6 0
The Warsaw Convention has been ratified by thirty
countries 6 ' including the United States. According to Article
17, the carrier is responsible in damages in case of death of,
and injury to, a passenger, if the accident which caused
them took place on board the aircraft or in the course of
embarkation or landing. By the provisions of Article 18 the
carrier is responsible in damages in case of destruction and
loss of, or damage to, registered baggage and merchandise,
if the incident which cause the damage took place "in the
course of air transportation." "In the course of air transportation" includes the period of time during which the property is under guard of the carrier, whether at the airport
57. Buhler, "Limitation of Air Carriers' Tort Liability and Related
58.
59.

Insurance Coverage-A Proposed Federal Air Passengers' Liability Act" (1940) 11 Air L. Rev. 262, 288.
U.S. Treaty Series 876, 1934 U.S. Av. R. 245.
Dept. of State Treaty Info. Bull. No. 47 (Aug. 1933), 1933 U.S.

61.

Australia and territory under mandate; Belgium, including Belgian

Av. R. 284.
60. See note 57, supra.

Congo and territory under mandate; Brazil; Czechoslovakia; Den-

mark;

France, including colonies, protectorates,

and mandated

territories; Germany; Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in-

cluding the largest part of her possessions and colonies; Italy,
including possessions and colonies; Latvia; Netherlands, including Netherland West Indies, Surinam Curacao; Norway and possessions; Poland, Rumania; Spain and Spanish Morocco and colonies;
Switzerland; U.S.S.R.; and Yugoslavia. Adhering countries: Danzig;
Finland; Greece; Hungary; India; Ireland; Liberia; Liechenstein:
Mexico; New Zealand; Sweden; U.S. of America; (U.S. announced
adherence Oct. 29 t 1934).

19471

RES IPSA IN

THE AIR

or on board the airplane, or at some other place, outside an
airport, where the plane may be forced to land.62
The Warsaw Convention does not provide for absolute
liability. On the contrary, Article 20 stipulates that a defendant shall not be liable, if he proves that he or his agents
have taken all necessary measures to avoid the injury, or
that it was impossible to take such measures. The effect of
this provision is to shift the burden of proof to the defendant
and if he fails to discharge it, plaintiff is entitled to a directed
verdict.
The Warsaw Convention stipulates that all rules of
the Convention as to responsibility are mandatory and that
any contractual modification of, or exemption from, the same
are invalid.
The Rome Convention provides for absolute liability,
but its scope is more limited than that of the Warsaw Convention. It stipulates that injury caused, by aircraft in
flight, to persons or property on the surface, shall give a
right to compensation. The plaintiff's burden is merely to
establish that the injury exists and that it was caused by
the defendant's aircraft. This convention has not enjoyed
wide adoption; in fact, it has only been ratified by five
countries."
The Uniform State Law for Aeronautics"4 which has
been adopted by fourteen states and Hawaii" represents an
attempt of state legislatures to partially replace res ipsa with
a statute. Section 5 provides that the owner or lessee of an
aircraft is absolutely liable to persons or property on the
ground for damage caused by the ascent, descent, or flight
of an aircraft or the dropping or falling of any object therefrom. Section 6 stipulates that the owner's liability in cases
growing out of collisions between aircraft shall be determined by the rules of law applicable to torts on land. Since
the act makes no provision for determining the owner's liability in the ordinary transportation of persons and property,
the plaintiffs (even though they bring their actions in states
which have adopted the Uniform Act) must still resort to
the res ipsa doctrine and (or) specific allegations of negligence.
For a discussion of this convention see Buhler, "Limitation of Air
Carriers' Tort Liability and Related Insurance Coverage-A Proposed Federal Air Passengers' Liability Act" (1940) 11 Air L.
Rev. 262, 282.
63. Spain, Rumania, Belgium, Guatemala and Brazil.
64. 11 Uniform Laws Ann. 161 (1938); 1928 U.S. Av. R. 472.
65. Del., Ind., Mich., Minn., Nev., N.J., N.C., N.D., R.I., S.C., S.D.,
Tenn., Vt., and Wis.
62.
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The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 contains no provision
with respect to the liability of interstate common carriers by
aircraft. The Civil Aeronautics Board, however, has recommended the adoption of a comprehensive federal aviation
liability statute in place of the enactment of state aviation
liability laws. It urges the Federal Government to define
liability in aircraft accidents, and authorize a federal agency
to compel, by regulation, all classes of aircraft operators
to carry liability insurance. In addition, the Board criticizes
the present laws governing accident liability, pointing out
that they are not particularly well adapted to the peculiar
characteristics of travel by air. 6s
The Lea Bill or Air Carrier Liability Act

6T

proposes

liability for injuries or death of passengers in a form of
statutory res ipsa and would require the defendant to prove
his non-negligence.
The need for passenger protection through res ipsa or
absolute liability is emphasized by a study of recent aviation
accidents. From January to November of 1946, five
hundred and forty-six persons lost their lives in forty-six
reported crashes of large passenger-carrying planes throughout the world. It is impossible to determine the causes of
many of these air accidents; but it seems possible that the
extension of liability would tend to make transportation
safer; i.e., increased liability would reflect directly on the
character of the service. Indeed, the protection of the passengers through compensation against financial loss from
injury is as clearly a part of the service as protection from
the injury itself.68 It is certain that the trend is toward
such liability; sooner or later it will come.6"
But for the present, plaintiffs in most jurisdictions and
in most types of aviation accident cases (where the cause
of the accident is unknown) will be forced to invoke res ipsa
loquitor. Since the application of the doctrine follows no
jurisdictional pattern and is rejected as often as it is applied,
plaintiffs can only hope for, but cannot depend on, its application to discharge their burden of showing some negligence
on the part of the defendant.
66.

Civil Aeronautics Board Annual Report (1941) p. 6; for a dis-

cussion of this, see Wilson & Anderson, "Liabiblity of Air Carriers" (1942) 13 J. Air L. 281, 299.

67. Binzer, "Civil Aviation-The Relative Scope of Juridsdiction of
The State and Federal Governments" (1945) 34 Ky. L.J. 276.
68. Note (1933) 4 J. Air L. 429, 434.
69. Fike, "Air Transportation Protection" (1937) 8 Air L. Rev. 316.

